An MT103 Copy Does Not Authenticate a New Fee Request

Suppose your team is chasing a business transfer when an email arrives requesting an additional fee. Attached is an MT103-style copy containing the expected names, amount and payment reference. The request appears in a familiar conversation, and the sender says paying the fee will resolve the delay.

The attachment makes the request look credible. It does not make it authorised. Even if a bank confirms that the underlying message is authentic, that confirmation does not establish that your business owes the new fee—or that the proposed account is the right place to send it.

The approval principle is simple: verify the new fee and its payment destination independently of the request. Evidence about the original transfer cannot substitute for authority to make another payment.

An authentic message is not a separate payment obligation

MT103 payment verification can answer an important question about the original transaction. The mistake is allowing that answer to settle a different question: whether to approve an additional payment.

Swift warns both that scammers fabricate message copies and that authentic messages can be misused or misrepresented. There are therefore two risks to consider. The copy may be false; alternatively, it may relate to a genuine transaction while being used to support an unauthorised demand.

In the second case, finding no fault with the message does not resolve the problem. A real message does not, by itself, establish the basis of the fee, the requester's authority to collect it or the legitimacy of the collection account. Calling the demand “correspondent bank fees” does not supply that missing evidence.

This is not a reason to treat every additional charge as fraudulent. It is a reason to assess the charge on its own merits, rather than borrowing credibility from the attachment.

Why familiar details do not close the gap

A request with accurate references deserves attention. It does not necessarily deserve approval.

The FBI describes business email compromise involving both spoofed familiar senders and attackers gaining access to legitimate email threads about billing and invoices. That access can make a fraudulent request fit the conversation: the right people, the right transaction and a plausible explanation for why action is needed now.

For an approver, the distinction is between knowledge and authority. Someone who knows the payment details has demonstrated access to information—not necessarily permission to issue new instructions.

Replying in the same thread to ask “Are these details correct?” does not create an independent check. If an attacker controls the conversation, the confirmation can come from the same attacker.

Use the bank to check the message, then check the demand

The financial institutions identified as sender or receiver, or otherwise referred to in the transaction, provide a route beyond inspecting the copy. Institutions connected to Swift can confirm whether they sent or received a particular message and can advise on the nature of transactions. What they can disclose to your business will depend on the relationship and circumstances; this is not unrestricted access to transaction information for any caller.

Start through your own bank's established channel. If you need to contact another institution or the organisation said to be charging the fee, use contact details held independently of the demand or look up its genuine number separately. Do not rely on a telephone number included in the fee email or attachment. The FBI specifically recommends independently looking up company numbers and verifying payment requests and changes in account details or payment procedures.

Make the purpose of the inquiry explicit. “Did you send this message?” and “Is this additional payment authorised?” are different questions. The second needs answers about:

• The obligation: what the fee covers, its amount and currency, and the basis on which your business is expected to pay it.
• The authority: whether the organisation said to be charging the fee issued the demand and authorised the requester to collect it.
• The destination: whether the exact beneficiary and account details are approved for that payment.

Your bank may be able to confirm the original message without being able to validate another party's fee. In that case, the message check has succeeded, but the fee approval remains unresolved. The charging organisation still needs to be reached independently.

Return to the delayed-transfer scenario: a bank's confirmation that it sent the message is useful progress, not clearance to pay the new account. Keep the original payment inquiry moving while holding the additional fee for verification. That separation lets the team pursue a prompt resolution without allowing urgency to decide an unrelated approval.

If the fee has already been paid

If fraud is suspected after the additional payment has been sent, contact the originating financial institution immediately. Do not wait for another explanation from the requester or spend the first response re-examining the MT103 copy.

The FBI advises asking the originating institution to contact the receiving institution. IC3 also advises requesting a recall or reversal as soon as fraud is recognised. Recovery is not assured, so the priority is to give the bank the opportunity to act promptly.

Keep the correspondence, attachment and payment details available for the bank and any fraud report. IC3 is a US reporting route; filing a complaint should not delay the bank contact.

Conclusion

An MT103 copy can help investigate a transfer. It cannot, on its own, authorise a new fee. Approve the additional payment only after independently establishing the obligation, the requester's authority and the exact destination—not merely that the original message exists.

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